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Abstract 
The natural classification of socialism in the evolution of the history of 
humanity is one more difficulty for many thinkers. Surprisingly enough, many 
intelligent people try to deny the sense of history by challenging historical 
reality. In other words, though it existed, it would have been much better for 
socialism not to have existed in the history of humanity. 
The dereliction of socialist ideology after 1989, the cancellation or 
ridicule of the principles and ideals expressed in the cant of the boring and 
demonetized slogans prove the fragility of the much-invoked damage of the so-
called communist politics as an essence of the system. It was not the ideology, 
or the code of the communists’ ethics or the supremacy of socialist property 
that made up the sense and essence of socialism as applied after 1948. 
The ‘objective’ of applied socialism was the forced, accelerated 
development of the economies of the central and south-eastern European 
countries, based on the experience of USSR for the compatibility of the 
structure of the consumption demand of their inhabitants with the supply of the 
industrialized countries in a historical interval as soon as possible. God knows 
whether the effects of extending capitalism in these countries instead of 
socialism would have been the same or maybe even better until 1989! The fact 
is that socialism was imposed from the outside, without following in any way 
whatsoever the Marxist schedule of proletarian revolution determined by the 
enhancement of internal class contradictions. 
The study of the League of Nations in 1945 reveals the programmatic 
character or, if not, at least the prophetic character of the advanced analyses 
and forecasts based on the developments of the 1870-1938 period. 
• during the interwar period, the gaps between the manufactured products 
exporting countries and the raw materials supplying countries widened; 
• the diminution of the purchasing power in the countries exporting the 
basic commodities put more acutely in danger the sales of the countries 
manufacturing processed industrial goods; 
•   the economic gaps between the West and the East, i.e. the North and 
the South, could be reduced only by the fast industrialization of the countries 
exporting raw materials; 
• the role of the external capital in the development of national 
economies was proved to be the least controversial; the internal, national 
accumulation was decisive; 
• the free initiative, individualism and pseudo-market economy had 
proven their limits, as they had been ineffective for an accelerated 
development of the countries during early industrialization; 
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• the study of the League of Nations highlights the need of the constant 
intervention of the state in economy by means of central planning. 
Though socialism was not expressly recommended as the best solution 
for the forced economic growth and development of the raw materials 
supplying countries, the study of the League of Nations in 1945 argues and 
supports measures and convergent ways of action to a very similar socio-
economic system. 
Keywords: accelerated development, forced industrialization, socialism 
urbanization, central planning 
JEL Classification: N10 
 
 
Introduction 
Historical need of socialism 
The socialism period still is one of the most controversial ages of the evolution 
of the economies of the former ‘socialist camp’. The analyses of the causes of 
socialism institutionalization have been focused so far on mainly geo-political and 
ideological arguments. Most of the historians invoked the expansion of Soviet 
imperialism, the developed capitalist countries were accused for abandoning Eastern 
Europe in the hands of the Bolsheviks on the line of the so often mentioned 
agreements in Casablanca, Cairo, Tehran – 1943, Yalta and Potsdam respectively – 
1945. 
The collapse of socialism in the 9th and 10th decades of the 20th century in 
most of the countries where it had been settled was insufficiently explained too, 
starting even with the huge Soviet power. What was the historical point of dividing 
the zones of influence for 45 years only? 
A relevant analysis of the economic factors which determined the socialist 
hiatus has not yet been made. 
Was socialism an experiment in history? An experiment made by whom? 
And to what purpose? Was socialism an accident of history? An accident which 
covered 5-8 decades?! 
Was socialism a historical need? How can we establish what is necessary to 
take place in history? 
The perspective of our analysis aims at this latter variant: socialism was a 
historically necessary stage. Although it seems difficult to understand and to digest 
such an interpretation, the historical analysis of the evolution of Romania’s 
economy in over 150 years of attempts of attraction to Western civilization leads to 
this conclusion. 
 
The dependence of the developed countries economies upon the agrarian 
economies markets 
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The economic growth of the industrialized countries during 1800-1940 was 
manifested by their permanent expansion on the international markets. Unfortunately, 
the external, international or world market was objectively limited. 
The expansion of Western economies was conditioned by the capacity of 
absorption of industrial products by the other economies of the world. 
In its turn, the capacity of absorption of the various markets peripheral to the 
European and American economy was determined by: 
1) the degree of compatibility of the structure of consumption demand in the 
importing countries with the structure of the supply in the industrialized 
countries; 
2) the purchasing power of the consumers in the countries targeted to become 
importers of industrial products. 
 
The failure of the efforts of compatibility of demand and supply 
The expansionist trends of Western industrial society were revived during the 
interwar period (1919-1939): the issue of the redistribution of national markets 
reappears acutely. At the same time, the operating conditions and the factors of 
influence of international trade are discussed. 
It is worth mentioning that the same issues were specific for the expansion 
trends of the West during the mid-19th century (at the beginning of the 
modernization of the Romanian national state). 
The solution adopted at that time was the introduction of liberal and market 
economy institutions in peripheral countries in order to achieve the compatibility 
between business environments, as well as the cut of transaction costs. 
After 80 years (1860-1940) of ‘implementation’ of capitalism and market 
economy in the peripheral countries, the results were utterly unsatisfactory. Self-
consumption, the low income of most of the inhabitants, the consumer habits 
specific for a predominantly rural population were merely blocking the access of 
foreign products on the markets of such countries. During the eight decades, the 
economic gaps between the industrialized countries and the agrarian countries were 
not attenuated, on the contrary, they worsened. 
It is obvious that a period of only 80 years, which corresponds in the history 
of mankind to the life of three generations, could not possibly assure a proper 
homogenization of the conditions of the centre and of the suburbs. The 
compatibility of lifestyles, mentalities and behaviours was still to be expected on 
long term. Preserving the institutional framework of democracy and market 
economy, nobody could have specified how much time was required for Romania, 
Bulgaria, Serbia, Slovakia, Poland etc. to become safe markets for the products and 
services of industrialized economies. 
 
The acceleration of economic development – best solution. The study of the 
League of Nations in 1945, Industrialisation et commerce exterieur 
(Industrialization and foreign trade) 
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The development of international events during the last 150 years shows that 
the West was around World War II in a great dilemma: 
a) either to ‘wait’ on a hard-to-determine term in the improvement of the 
operation of market economy in peripheral countries and the proper 
growth of the purchasing capacity of such countries; 
b) or to assure the radical acceleration of economic growth in the countries 
aimed at becoming markets for the products of industrialized economies. 
Deliberately adopting the second ‘solution’ has no longer the nature of a 
working hypothesis in historical research. In the light of the development of world 
economy from 1945 until today this interpretation gets a character of thesis. 
The decisive arguments of the need for the acceleration of economic 
development in the non-industrialized or poorly industrialized countries are 
provided by the remarkable study of the League of Nations in 1945, 
Industrialisation et commerce exterieur. From the point of view of this study, the 
total control of the state appears as the best way of assuring a very accelerated 
economic development in the sense of compatibility in an as short as possible 
historical interval between the structure of domestic consumption demand and the 
structure of the supply of industrial products of the West. 
Having considered the arguments in the above-mentioned paper, it is obvious 
that the socialist period, as we will see, cannot be considered an experiment or an 
accident of history, but a historical need from at least one point of view. 
 
Literature review 
Starting with the 5th-6th decades of the 19th century, the theme of the need for 
accelerated industrialization of the European countries ‘pursuers’ of England is 
approached from inside the concerned economies. Friedrich List is the first 
economist who supports the primacy of national1 interest on the liberalization of 
international trade invoked by the classics of political economy. 
List was a landmark for the evolution of two emerging economies at that 
time, the economies of some countries which would dominate Europe and the 
world: Germany and the United States of America. He strongly disputed in full 
expansion of the fundamentals of classical political economy liberalism, under the 
influence of Alexander Hamilton, the arguments in favour of extending the free 
trade in international trade already established by the classics (Smith, Ricardo, 
Mill, Say, Bastiat, etc.), saying that for a country, at the beginning of its 
development, it is essential to build its own domestic productive forces by 
                                                 
1
 In his fundamental work, List introduces expressly the word ‚national’ in the title of the work 
itself in 1841: Das Nationale System der Politischen Oekonomie. It is not only a speculation to note 
that List uses the word ‚national’ in the singular and as an attribute of a ‚system’, while Adam Smith, 
65 years before, referred to the wealth of the ‚nations’. The focus shifted at that time from searching 
global solutions characteristic for the age of the enlightenment and encyclopaedism to the local-
regional consolidation at the national level. Today, the word national tends to be eliminated from the 
vocabulary of globalization. 
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developing national industry instead of depending on the import of manufactured 
products from the already industrialized countries.  
National industry must already be protected in its beginnings against foreign 
competition; the argument of ‘common sense’ invoked by Friderich List is of 
supporting industry in the stage of its infancy (infant industry argument). 
List is famous as a forerunner of the German historical school and his ideas 
were followed and developed in Germany by Wilhelm Roscher, Karl Knies, Bruno 
Hildebrand, Gustav von Schmoller, Karl Bücher, Adolph Wagner, Werner 
Sombart. In the United States of America, List was followed by Henry Charles 
Carey, Simon Nelson Patten etc. 
The first representative of List doctrine in Romania is D.P. Martian, followed 
by B.P. Hasdeu, P.S. Aurelian, A.D. Xenopol, M. Kogalniceanu, E. Costinescu, An. 
Stolojan, Al. Djuvara, D.C. Butculescu a.s.o. until World War I. During the interwar 
period, economic nationalism developed due to the contributions of I.N. Angelescu, 
St. Zeletin, C. Ianculescu, Mitita Constantinescu, N.P. Arcadian, V.N. Madgearu. 
The ideological development of a great economist such as V.N. Madgearu is 
interesting and inspiring. In most of his publications between 1920-1939, 
Madgearu represented the interests of the peasants, i.e. of the National Peasant 
Party, and he was the opponent of encouraged and state-protected industrialization 
and the supporter of the intervention of foreign capital. In his work dated 19402, 
Madgearu analyzed maturely and objectively the evolution of Romanian economy 
during the interwar period, and emphasized on the inherent dangers of the growth 
of relative agricultural overpopulation and the need of industrialization and 
intervention of the state in the economy by planning.  
The need for the national industry development was systematically supported, 
remarkably by the argumentative effort, by Mihail Manoilescu, the most worldwide 
famous Romanian economist in the interwar period. Starting from the Listian 
doctrine of the educational protection of industry, Manoilescu tried to elaborate a 
true theory of industrial protectionism opposable to the theory of international 
commerce and of free trade.3 His paper was published first in French under the title 
Théorie du protectionisme et de l’échange international, Paris, Girard 1929, then in 
English, Portuguese, Italian (1931) and German (1937). Long labelled ‘reactionary’, 
‘fascist’ or ‘legionnaire’, Mihail Manoilescu was rehabilitated by publishing his 
work in Romanian in 1986! 
Despite his extreme right orientation, Manolescian ideology was mostly 
‘applied’ unintentionally by the communist regime not only in the field of 
industrial development. 
Practically speaking, we may say that if Friedrich List had been the 
‘ideologist’ of the system of economic ascent of Germany and the USA, Mihail 
Manoilescu was not only the theoretician, but also the programmer of accelerated 
                                                 
2
 V.N. Madgearu, Evolutia economiei romanesti dupa razboiul mondial (Evolution of 
Romanian economy after the world war), Editura Enciclopedica, Bucharest, 1995. 
3
 Mihail Manoilescu, Fortele nationale productive si comertul exterior. Teoria 
protectionismului si a schimbului international (Productive national forces and foreign trade. Theory 
of protectionism and international trade), Editura Stiintifica si Enciclopedica, 1986. 
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economic development of the countries supplying raw materials at the beginning of 
industrialization bout in the interwar period and after 1945. 
 
Determinants of socialism institutionalization 
If at the beginning of World War II Romania had crossed a transition period 
of eight decades (1859-1939), from one type of feudalism to a type of pseudo-
capitalism, the passing to socialism after 1944 was made without a ‘transition’, by 
the intervention of Soviet armies. True, socialist historiology had identified a 4-
year period (1944-1947) when a ’bourgeois-democratic revolution’ would have 
taken place, a necessary stage for passing to the ‘proletary revolution’. 
It is less meaningful for the history of economy the way in which the transfer 
of political power and the instauration of the ‘proletariat dictatorship’ were done. It 
is essential for the synthetic description of the new type of society the almost fully 
abolition of the private property institutions and the establishment of the state 
property by the nationalization of the main means of production and extension of 
the cooperative system. 
The conditions and causes which determined the establishment of the State 
monopolist socialism are relevant for the history of economy – with its strictly 
nominative variant, communism4 – in some countries of the world. 
 
Deterioration of the international economic relations in the interwar period 
The theory of international trade had set out clearly enough until 1940 the 
idea that for harmonious and efficient development of mankind the following 
conditions would be sufficient: 
− deepening of the international division of labour; 
− widening the application of the free trade principles in international trade. 
Unfortunately, the three decades elapsed from the start of the first world war 
until the end of the second world war (1914-1945) brought about developments in 
contradiction with the expected ones, i.e.: 
− start of the inflation by suspending and abandoning the gold-standard 
monetary system; 
− to cope with the exorbitant money demand from the governments of the 
countries involved in the First World War and in the immediately 
following period, the central banks issued huge amounts of monetary signs 
not backed in gold; the paper money became legal payment means; 
− severe distortions of the international commercial and currency circuits; 
− abandonment of free trade; 
                                                 
4
 The term communism, so frequently used after 1989, has subjective-pejorative connotations, 
with ethical load. The approach from an objective politological and sociological perspective imposes 
the use of the notion of socialism, even if the leading political forces in most of such countries were 
the so-called communist parties. Communism remained even after 45 years of socialism ‚mankind’s 
(golden) dream’! 
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− exacerbation of the competition between the industrialized countries in 
search of new outlets; 
− severe deterioration of the terms of trade in international trade; phrased as 
such, during the agrarian crisis 1928-1936, the countries exporting raw 
materials (agricultural and non-agricultural) needed to export a large 
quantity (in some cases almost double) of goods to import the same 
quantity of industrial products as before the crisis; 
− considerable reduction of the purchasing capacity of the raw material 
supplying countries during the crisis of 1929-1933 by opening the price 
scissors detrimental to this category of countries; 
− evolution of the terms of trade to the detriment of the raw material 
supplying countries associated with the process of capital ‘evasion’ as a 
result of the crisis brought some industrialized countries to bankruptcy and 
were obliged to declare the insolvency of external debts (the case of 
Romania in 1932); 
− as a result of the diminution of currency receipts of the raw material 
exporting countries, their demand for industrial products decreased 
considerably; 
− escalation of the tariff and non-tariff protectionism in most of the 
countries; 
− generally, the industrialized countries imposed aggressive measures of 
protection firstly for their agriculture; 
− in the raw material manufacturing and exporting countries, the efforts of 
stimulation of industry development were increased. 
 
Reactions to the trends of accelerated industrialization of the commodity 
exporting countries 
In the context of the increase of the aggressiveness of expansionist economic 
policies practiced in the industrialized countries in search for new markets (outlets), 
the attempts of establishment and encouragement of industry development in the 
various raw material manufacturing and exporting countries (commodities) were 
looked upon suspiciously and even with fear by the representatives of the interests of 
the industrial producers in the developed countries. 
The perturbations brought by World War I and the big crisis between 1929-
1933 had determined the start or increase of industrialization in some 
manufacturing and exporting countries especially of commodities, causing short 
circuits in the foreign trade of the old industrialized countries. 
The western economists and politicians repeatedly expressed their fears 
against the consequences of the continuation of industrialization in the agrarian 
countries respectively, in general, in the raw material supplying countries. The 
artificial or forced industrialization encouraged by the state was considered one of 
the causes of the deterioration of the international economic relations. 
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Transition from free trade to protectionism. Manufacturing industry, 
balance of trade and balance of payments 
The old industrial countries were – and still are – the main importers and 
exporters of manufactured items. As only the net imports of these items provided 
for the funding of the food and industrial raw materials imports, it was necessary to 
analyze the trade balance with manufactured and commodities. 
Thus it was found that the industrially developed countries, which owned 
limited natural resources as compared to the population and their level of industrial 
development (the Japan case, for example), had to assure the increase of the net 
exports of manufactured products and of the net commodity imports. 
Nevertheless, it was estimated that such an evolution of their trade balances 
was not incompatible with the industrial boom that might occur in certain areas. 
This remark was based on the previous evolutions, namely, it had been 
noticed that the countries advantaged from the point of view of natural resources 
had increased their imports of manufactured items at the same time with the 
development of their manufacturing industry. Thus, until 1913 nothing had let to be 
seen that the progressive expansion of the industry of other countries could have 
disturbed the balances of the old industrial countries to the reduction of the rate of 
economic development; on the contrary, the concerned countries had preserved 
their position and were able to improve it. 
The disturbance of the international economic relations during and after 
World War I affected to some extent the trade balances of these countries. 
After the blockage of multilateral trade, at the beginning of the 4th decade, the 
prevalence of the actions of the factors of disintegration of international economy 
generated great difficulties to the performance of the primary products flow in the 
direction of the industrialized states. 
The continuation of these flows was assured: 
• either by adopting a commercial policy which contributed to the start of the 
general economic war; 
• or by financing more and more because of the diminution of capital 
exports; 
• or by the liquidation of foreign availabilities. 
During the regime of multilateral exchanges which functioned after the 1929 
crisis, the current accounts of the balance of payments of the industrially 
advanced countries were balanced by means of the active balance of the 
‘invisibles’, i.e. of the revenues obtained from the maritime transports and 
insurance, from the repatriation of the profits of the overseas capital investments 
etc. Thus, for example, the UK could afford for over 100 years (starting with 1813) 
to import on an annual basis more than it exported, compensating the trade deficit 
by the capital inflows coming from the profits of the overseas investments, 
transports, international insurance etc. This was the practical foundation of the 
doctrine of liberalization of international trade promoted from Adam Smith on. 
The massive withdrawal of capitals following the chain collapse of some large 
banks entailed the impossibility of maintaining – on a long tem – the deficit of the 
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trade balance. Consequently, some countries with a tradition in the line of liberalism 
– Great Britain, for instance – had to adopt measures of restricting imports. 
All the more so in the case of the countries lacking currency reserves – 
Romania case – under the conditions of the crisis, in 1930, the balancing of the 
balance of payments could not have been achieved except by serious trade balance 
surpluses. The latter obviously could not have been obtained as a result of the 
increase of the value volume of export, both due to the catastrophic decline in 
prices of commodities (agricultural and oil, in the case of Romania), and as a result 
of the incapacity of structural adaptation of the agricultural production (Romanian) 
to the signals of the European and world market. The promotion of aggressive 
protectionism in a world ‘entered into delirium’ – according to the remarks of a 
contemporary analyst – was a measure of defence in the case of a country with a 
predominantly agrarian economy.  
 
Arguments in favour of continuing the process of industrialization of the 
countries producing basic goods 
It is extremely eloquent in this respect the analysis made under the League of 
Nations by a group of researchers from several countries, an analysis published in 
1945 under the title Industrialization and foreign trade. The study estimates the 
consequences of the industrialization of some countries producing and exporting 
basic goods, i.e. the agricultural countries, could have had on international trade 
and on the evolution of industry in the developed countries. The performed 
analyses aim at comparisons of the evolution of the industrial production and of 
international trade in various countries of the world between 1870-1929. 
The above-mentioned study sets forth consistent arguments in favour of the 
radical change in no time of the social and economic structures of the non-
industrialized or at the beginning of industrialization countries. The most important 
arguments are exposed below. 
a. Demand for industrial products on the international market largely 
depended on the export capacity of the countries producing basic goods. The 
countries which had no developed manufacturing industry could not generally 
purchase such goods except as a result and to the extent of their commodity exports. 
The strict dependence of the exports of such countries on the branches 
supplying raw material (agriculture and extractive industry) had already started to 
affect seriously the exports of industrial products (finite and semi-manufactured) of 
the developed countries. 
The most pressing problem still was the correlation between the demand for 
basics and the supply of industrial goods. 
b. If the increase of the industrial production of the countries at the beginning 
of industrialization would have been accompanied by a corresponding increase of the 
imports of manufactured goods (finite and semi-finite products), the production of 
the industry of these countries would not have brought about prejudice to the 
exporters of the developed industrialized countries. 
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Under regular conditions5, the imports from the old industrial countries 
would not have decreased following the development of the industry in other 
countries. The latter industrialization would have determined the diversification of 
their demand for consumption goods and the increase of the demand of 
manufactured goods on the world market. 
c. Another reason why it was expected that industrial development would not 
have caused a reduction of the imports of industrial products was that in the 
countries with a dense population in particular, the industry ‘the most susceptible 
of progress’ was decentralized and depended on the local markets where, before 
creating this industry, the purchasing power in view of purchasing manufactured 
industrial products was limited. 
d. On the other hand, the capacity of absorption of large potential markets 
was considered.6 Huge consumption potential markets had been too little or not at 
all attracted in the circuit of the world market until the 4th decade of the 20th 
century (USSR with an economy already in a process of accelerated development 
until 1940, China, India, South-East India, and the markets of the countries in 
Eastern and South-East Europe). 
e.  It was expected that by maintaining the already consecrate socio-economic 
structures between 1860-1940 in the poorly or at all industrialized countries, the 
considerable gaps between the consumption levels in the two categories would 
have increased in the following period. In the best case scenario, a relative 
mitigation of the gaps would have taken place in an impossible to be specified 
interval of time. The countries needed in order to assure compatible markets the as 
quick modification as possible not only of a consumption demand structure but also 
of the purchasing power of the non-industrialized countries. 
f. To cover the huge potential demand of manufactured industrial products 
estimated worldwide and the increase of the purchasing capacity, it was estimated 
that the solution could have been the accelerated industrialization of such areas. 
The higher labour productivity, typical for mechanization, would have determined 
the enhancement of the industrial product supply by the development or 
establishment of some branches of the manufacturing industry. 
g. It was stated that in order to remove all the fears of the representatives of the 
interests of the developed countries, in the countries at the beginning of 
industrialization, the development of industry would have met sufficient adverse 
reactions, was therefore slowed down since the very beginning. Meanwhile the 
developed countries would have had the time to restructure the supply after the 
potential diminution of the demand of manufactured industrial goods determined by 
the industrialization of the other countries. In this respect, the very increase of the 
                                                 
5
 ‘Regular conditions’ means the conditions characteristic of international trade until 
1914, respectively until the start of the 1929-1933 crisis, when the moderate tariff barriers 
did not determine stagnations or absolute reductions of the foreign trade volume. 
6
 The statistic research made by the League of Nations revealed that between 1926-
1929, the production of industrial goods – besides food products – imported or processed in 
the concerned country, varied between USD 250 per US inhabitant and USD 3 in China.   
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exports of manufactured industrial products in the recently industrialized countries 
would have faced side effects which would have counterbalanced partially or totally 
the competition of the production of the old industrialized states. 
h. The analysis made at the level of the League of Nations highlighted the 
fact that industrialization generally involves great sacrifice in the countries where 
it occurs artificially, forcedly and in an accelerated way and when the international 
economic relations had been back to normal, it would have been proved as anti-
economic by its artificialism.7 In other words, it was admitted, and it is 
particularly significant for the liberal views which had been prevailing until the 
1929-1933 crisis, that artificial industrialization could be tolerated to the limit of a 
new crisis of the international economic relations, and then, by removing the 
protection and repeal of the measures of industry stimulation, ‘the international 
balance’ should be restored. The price would have been obviously the collapse of 
the artificially established and maintained branches in the less developed countries 
– ‘developing’, which actually happened in the 10th decade of the 20th century. 
i. After the start of the industrialization of some commodity exporting 
countries, some goods which used to be imported would have been substituted in 
consumption with products of domestic industry. Some industrializing countries 
which held insufficient quantities of currency would have been able to refocus a 
part of the funds designed for purchasing industrial goods to support commodity 
import. Thus it would have resulted an increase of the purchasing capacity of the 
other commodity exporting countries (still non-industrialized or on a lower level of 
industrialization) providing an at least constant level of the supply of manufactured 
products. 
j. The modifications noticed in the activity of the manufacturing industry and 
world trade on a long term, 1870-1938, are conclusive for the support of the same 
conclusion: the countries where industrialization had started quite recently had not 
become independent from the import of industrial products. 
Until 1930, the development of manufacturing industry – far from conferring 
to the concerned countries a certain independence in point of foreign manufactured 
items – had stimulated the import of such items, and the volume of transactions on 
the foreign market followed the trend of the parallel course of the activity of the 
manufacturing industry. 
It was found that on the contrary, the small countries usually depended on the 
import of these products more than before the start of industrialization and that in 
the case of some countries of analogous dimensions, a high industrial production 
per capita was usually accompanied by big imports of manufactured goods. 
Moreover, the countries whose industrial development had not been started still 
occupied the last places in point of imports of manufactured products per capita. The 
                                                 
7
  This point from all the conclusions of the study of the League of Nations is 
extremely important: the argument was ‘reassuring’ for the industrialized countries, which 
were assured the ‘return to normal’ in the case of ‘short circuit’ of international commercial 
relations, by removing the conditions of favouring the industry of the less developed 
countries. 
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exception to this rule were a few regions of secondary importance which owned 
maritime communications favourable for the sale of a large part of their production 
of commodities in exchange for the foreign manufactured products. 
The main distortions of this trend were determined by ‘external’ factors such as 
the modifications occurred in the commercial policies and perturbations caused in the 
international relations by the 1914-1918 war. After 1930, the prior relationship 
between production and commerce was broken in some countries which took 
measures of development of the manufacturing industry detrimental to imports. 
In a similar manner, the comparisons made showed that until the end of the 
1920-1930 period, the countries where the manufacturing industry had developed 
the fastest usually increased to a great extent the imports of manufactured items. 
The exports of manufactured products tended in their turn to increase with the 
production of manufacturing industry. The specific evolutions of the 1930-1938 
period led to the conclusion that the real danger for the old industrial countries was 
not the expansion of industry – i.e. its development in other countries – but the 
impossibility of restoring multilateral trade or the potential collapse of this trade, 
provided that it had been reset. 
The price competition, practiced in the recently industrialized countries, 
could have entailed losses on the market of some items considered in isolation, but 
under normal conditions, these losses would have been compensated by the 
proceedings generated by the new demand such competition would have caused, in 
various ways. These compensatory forces could not have possibly acted except 
under the conditions of a healthy operation of international trade. Great Britain lost 
several markets it had opened – in the previous periods, in the areas suppliers of 
raw materials – to the benefit of the competitor countries industrialized after it, 
especially after the collapse of the multilateral trade system, after 1930. 
Therefore, the risk that the demand of manufactured industrial products 
on the world market should diminish in the next period under the 
circumstances of the continuing industrialization of some countries is out of 
the question. On the contrary, the effects of a cascade artificial industrialization 
would have been to the advantage of the industrialized countries. 
 
Ways of assuring an accelerated development of the industry of some 
countries at the beginning of industrialization 
This point of the conclusions of the analyses made worldwide, published at 
the end of the work in 1945 – already quoted – of the League of Nations is 
particularly important to establish the direction of the presumptive evolution of 
economy of the agrarian states in south-eastern Europe after World War II. 
a. To enable proper conditions for forced industrialization in new regions on 
the globe, only the tariff barriers, specific measures for the industrial customs 
protectionism, were accepted on the background of the interventionist, persuasive 
measures mentioned above. The import restrictions to protectionist purposes were 
rejected which tended to favour national industry in the detriment of imports. 
 89 
b. In this respect, the study of the League of Nations in its conclusive remarks 
showed that a moderate protective tariff aiming to support the national 
manufacturing industry on the domestic market would have had only restrictive 
effects with a limited and temporary character on imports. The admission of 
legitimacy of some protectionist measures is all the more meaningful as it 
represented the result of the research performed at the level of an international 
forum which had always paid great efforts of reasoning and assuring the need for 
international trade freedom during the interwar period.  
c. To overcome the restrictive consequences determined by the protectionist 
practices, it was estimated that only an international concerted action would 
have allowed the avoidance and overcoming of the commercial perturbations 
of this kind and the development of the necessary conditions for a really 
satisfying economic development. In other words, the assurance of the survival of 
the artificial industries could have been done by creating some international bodies, 
among others, GATT –General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, turned in 1995 
into WTO – World Trade Organization), which should ‘harmonize’ the interests of 
the participating countries to international trade. 
In 1949 the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) was 
established for the future countries included in the ‘socialist camp’ meant to 
provide with foreign markets compatible with the levels of development of the 
respective industries. 
d. In the countries with a dense population, where approximately three quarters 
of the inhabitants dealt with agriculture, the development of industry was generally 
delayed because of the low standard of living – hence the poor accumulation of 
capitals and the absence of the propensity to saving –, the reduced labour 
productivity and the obsolete and inert social organization. The trade of such 
countries was not enough developed, the transport facilities were improper, the 
savings (accumulations) insufficient. 
Their industrialization would have claimed in particular a radical modification 
of the social values and of the administrative system, as well as a reorganization and 
rationalization of agriculture. Under such circumstances, the increase of agricultural 
production would have been possible, at the same time with the diminishing of the 
agricultural overpopulation; a large part of the population who dealt with agricultural 
works would have become available for industry and trade. 
In the first stages of industrialization, in the countries with a high density of 
the population, the development would have been enabled if industry had been 
decentralized and if the extent of the production had been relatively modest. In the 
case of an expanding, decentralized industry, a less deep social reorganization 
would have been sufficient: the useless urbanization would have been avoided, the 
use of the abundant resources of manpower would have been more available, and 
the need for investments in industry or in the public utility services lower. In the 
same countries with a dense population, the combination of a program of satisfying 
industrialization with measures aiming at the obstruction to an excessive growth of 
the population would have been necessary.  
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e. In these countries, it was important for the natural resources to be 
exhausted as little as possible to enable a progressive industrialization. It was 
estimated that some of these countries had probably overcome the stage where 
industrialization could have been spontaneous. In such cases, this should have been 
the object of a carefully established plan and followed-up by the government 
intervention and support. 
f. The foreign capital inflow was very important for the development of 
foreign trade and of the public utility services which were a prerequisite of 
industrialization. The experience of the interwar decades showed that the amounts 
of foreign capital available for the development of a manufacturing industry were 
extremely limited. Most of the industrial capitals should have been supplied by 
national accumulation. The possibilities of obtaining such capitals, even in the 
countries where there was no margin of tolerance for compressing consumption 
were deemed to be more than at first sight. 
g. Relying on a customs tariff as a unique or main means of stimulating 
industrialization had practically become a utopia. In order to succeed, an 
industrialization plan would have had to include in general a wide program of 
social renovation, of improvement of the hygienic conditions, of general and 
technical education, of the agricultural reforms and of the transport investments, in 
the production of power, and in the other public utility services. 
This is the end of the conclusions of the analysis of the study of the League 
of Nations, Industrialisation et commerce extérieur. 
Only one solution is missing from the expected ones: there is no mention 
about the need of nationalization of the means of production, i.e. the 
establishment of socialism. This path is only suggested by the severity and the 
extent of rigor involved in the other imperatives of expansionist essence contained 
in paragraphs 5.d, e, f and g. 
As we can see, such a comprehensive study elaborated by specialists of the 
most important international body excludes the variant of maintaining the 
structures and rates of economic growth before 1940. The preservation of existing 
traditions, mentalities, socio-administrative structures could not guarantee a fast 
enough industrialization to assure as soon as possible from the historical point of 
view the transformation of the agrarian countries and the raw material supplying 
countries for the Western markets. 
The League of Nations attempted by the medium-term analyses, 1870-1929, 
to identify solutions to expedite the industrial development of the commodity 
producing countries.  
 
Conclusions on the premises of socialism institutionalization in Romania, 
from the perspective of the interwar experience 
1. As evidenced by the conclusions of the analysis made by the League of 
Nations, the forced industrialization had become an imperative of re-
launching in as short a time as possible the international economic exchanges. 
Of all the expected solutions – the return to the gold-standard-based multilateral 
 91 
exchanges, the liberalization by reducing the intervention of the states and the 
international economic relations among national economic entities etc – it is 
obvious that the decision, just like in the intervals 1855-1866 and 1916-1919 had 
been made at a high level: this hypothesis leads to the substantiation of the 
reconsideration of the perspective of post-war reorganization of Europe and the 
world. 
2. Instead of returning to the gold standard, a new monetary system was set 
up in Bretton Woods which, far from removing the danger of national monetary 
inflation, consecrated the possibility of worldwide inflation. It was most unlikely 
for anyone to expect a return to the multilateral exchanges system before the World 
War I.  
3. The implantation of the ‘Iron Curtain’ – approximately on the barriers 
drawn at the end of Antiquity in South-Eastern Europe between the Eastern Roman 
Empire and the Western Roman Empire – enabled the distinct organization of the 
two categories of countries, industrial and agricultural. For the states recently 
entered under the guardianship of the Soviet Union, the totalitarian regime 
corresponded to a great extent to the conclusions expressed in the studies of the 
League of Nations. 
− ‘thoroughly established national plan and followed up with the intervention 
and support of the government’; 
− the increase of the internal accumulation rate; 
− sanitation, urbanization, electrification etc. programs  
the obvious motive of this divide of Europe and of the world was certainly not the 
trust in the state qualities as an organizer and entrepreneur, but the taking into 
consideration of the important gaps aggravated during the last interwar decade 
between the groups of states of ‘the two Europes’, industrial and agricultural. I met 
no optimistic mention in the specialized literature on the mitigation of the gaps 
without affecting the growth in the advanced countries by the ‘total’ liberalization 
of the international business relations, either on short term or on long term.  
And if ideally one could have admitted that by the long term ‘total 
liberalization’ a mitigation of the gaps might have been obtained, nobody could have 
said either whether this mitigation would have been achieved by potential reductions 
of the rates of growth of the industrialized regions, or how long would have lasted. 
According to the bitter experience of the autarkizations specific for the 4th 
decade, instead of a ‘total liberalization’, the development of zones of integral 
protectionism was chosen globally: the customs protectionism and the protectionism 
achieved by the legislation of encouragement of industry was attached the system of 
organic, integralist management of the (national) states with the whole amount of 
gradual objectives achieved – electrification, collectivization of agriculture, the 
implementation of large irrigation systems, sewerage, urbanization etc. – based on 
the unique national plans. In order to assure a foreign market for the manufactured 
products of these countries – which would have had small chances to penetrate from 
the very beginning the western markets –, the Council for Mutual Economic 
Assistance was established, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade was set 
up for the regulation of international economic exchange. 
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The most acute problem at the European and world level was the expedite 
growth of the economies of these countries. It was estimated that the high rate of 
growth could not be assured on a ‘liberal way’. This rate was necessary for the 
mitigation of the gaps especially from the point of view of the compatibility of the 
consumer markets with the supply of the industrialized countries. This idea is 
suggested – at least, if not obvious – by the conclusions of the above-mentioned 
study of the League of Nations. 
In support of the hypotheses presented we remind here two of the conclusions 
of the most reputed Romanian interwar economists: 
 
‘Today’s Eastern Europe is a poor client for Western Europe. But could 
Eastern Europe of tomorrow not become a rich client? This is the main problem of 
Europe. If the clients are poor, he who sells must take care first to make them rich!’ 
 
Mihail Manoilescu, Zusammenarbeit zwischen Ost-und Westeuropa auf 
meuer Grundlage, in ‘Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv’, Bd. 41, März, 1935, Heft 2, p. 
167. 
 
‘Without assuring a continued growth of the accumulation of capital, the 
national economy of a people cannot represent a safe foundation to build a national 
state on. 
Once established that on its way to a distorted capitalist economy by a 
chaotic state interventionism, spasmodic and exposed to all influences, Romanian 
economy could not accumulate Romanian productive capitals, only two roads 
remain open: the road of pure liberal capitalist economy or the state-controlled 
organized economy. The first – in the light of the experience of the whole world – 
appears as utopian; the second, which emerges from the life conditions of the 
country and from the need to build strong foundations for the development of the 
Romanian national state, far from being looked upon as a Promised Land appears 
as a national imperative.’ 
 
Virgil N. Madgearu, Evolutia economiei romanesti, Editura Stiintifica, 
Bucharest, 1995, p. 290. 
 
It is most likely that the formation of the consumption habits and the 
improvement of the purchasing power of a huge amount of rural population – 
if we consider also China’s potential – who in 1938 was still providing with the 
basic needs from self-consumption, could not have possibly completed in the 
short interval of 50 years on the way of free evolution by itself.  
It becomes obvious that adopting the socialism path was the historically 
necessary solution for the acceleration of the economic development of lagging 
countries. ‘The historical coincidence’ of the collapse of the socialist system in 
1989 in most of the countries where this system had been introduced after 1945 
proves that the objectives established in 1945 had been attained. 
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The arguments in support of this thesis are clear: 
A. In the case of Romania, after extremely low rates of growth in 1859, only 
by the intervention of the great European powers and the organization of an 
interventional economy was the process of modernization started. It is not hard to 
imagine that without those interventions the Romanian Countries would have still 
‘lain’ either under Ottoman rule, or in a smooth, peaceful patriarchal life. 
B. The introduction and application of the ‘institutions of freedom’ – for 80 
years – according to the western model seemingly had unsatisfactory results in the 
case of Eastern Europe. It is the only possible way to explain coherently the 
decisions made – worldwide – of expansion of the Soviet totalitarian system and, 
from the historical point of view, the developments in the ‘40s correlated with 
those of the last half of the 9th decade of the 20th century. 
The analysis of the extent in which the objectives by the organization of the 
world after 1945 attained their purpose is the very analysis of the ‘achievements’ of 
socialism. Yet, it is beyond any doubt that at least an objective was attained, 
namely the achievement of the compatibility of the demand structure in the 
countries with an important consumer market with the supply of manufactured 
industrial products of some important producers in the strongly industrialized 
countries. 
To what extent the purchasing power of the consumers in these countries will 
keep satisfying the need for outlets of the leading producers is still a challenge for 
the specialists, politicians and decision forums at the level of concerned countries. 
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